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If there is a vote to Leave on 23 June, minds will begin to focus on the UK’s commercial relationships with
both EU and non-EU countries. Ruth Lea argues that EFTA trade agreements seem to be the
best fit for the UK’s trading patterns, and appear to be superior to the current EU ones.
There has been much speculation that the relationship with the EU could be, for example, the
“Norwegian” option (staying in the Single Market), or the “Swiss” option (relying on bilateral trade
deals), or the vanilla World Trade Organisation (WTO) option in which there would be no special
deal with the EU at all. But it would be none of these options. I believe the UK would negotiate a
bespoke British deal with its EU partners. I would venture that it would, at the minimum, comprise a tariff-free FTA
with the EU, in order to avoid the EU’s Common External Tariff, and an agreement on “regulatory equivalence” for
financial services, which would provide the City with access to the EU’s markets much as passporting does now.1
The Norwegian option, which involves the freedom of movement of labour, strikes me as a political non-starter. I
would, moreover, expect such a deal to be agreed expeditiously. We would be negotiating as a completely
harmonised EU member and, given our huge trade deficit with other EU countries, our EU partners would not want
any disruption in their lucrative trade with us.
Brexit would, of course, change Britain’s commercial relationship with non-EU countries. One group would be those
countries with which the EU currently has trade agreements though, as we discuss below, not many of them matter
very much. These agreements could simply continue on after Brexit, providing all partners were satisfied. There
would be no need to undertake tortuous trade negotiations. Another group would be countries with which the EU
currently does not have trade agreements, including India, Australia, China and Japan. Doubtless the UK would start
to negotiate bilateral agreements once out of the straightjacket of the EU’s Customs Union (which prevents us from
bilaterally negotiating treaties now). But, I suggest, these negotiations would not be a matter of great urgency.
And, finally, there would be the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which currently comprises Switzerland,
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The UK was, of course, a founder member of EFTA in 1960, but left in 1973 on
accession to the European Economic Community (EEC). It would be helpful to re-join EFTA after Brexit.2 Not merely
would we have preferential access to EFTA’s markets, of which Switzerland and Norway are important, but there
would also be access to EFTA’s trade agreements, providing all partners were satisfied, of which there are many.
Crucially, as I discuss below, EFTA’s suite of trade agreements is almost certainly a “better fit” for the UK, given our
trading patterns, than the EU’s. And they are arguably more comprehensive. The UK economy could be given a real
boost by having access to these agreements.
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EFTA members
The pattern of Britain’s export trade
At this point it is instructive to note the pattern of Britain’s export trade. Table 1 shows that it is heavily skewed
towards the EU (44.4% in 2014) and the USA (17.1% in 2014). Together they accounted for over 60% of Britain’s
total exports. The next largest markets are Switzerland, China, the “Residual Gulf Arabian Countries” (as classified
in the ONS’s Pink Book and comprising Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Yemen, but excluding
Saudi Arabia) and Japan. India, Hong Kong, Australia, South Korea. Norway, Russia, Canada, Singapore and Saudi
Arabia comprise the next tier. These three tiers comprise the UK’s “top 15” of trading partners. And then there is a
fourth tier from Turkey to New Zealand.
Table 1 The UK’s main trading partners, exports of goods & services (2014, £bn)
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Sources: (i) ONS, “Pink Book, 2015 edition”, October 2015, table 9.3 (see also annex tables 3a-3c for the trade
data), (ii) WTO website on RTAs, (iii) European Commission website, “Overview of FTA & other trade negotiations”,
and (iv) EFTA website on trade agreements. Note: (i) FTA=Free Trade Agreements (goods), (ii) EIA=Economic
Integration Agreements (also cover services), (iii) GCC= Gulf Cooperation Council, comprising Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar & the UAE.
EFTA’s RTAs: a “better fit” for Britain than the EU’s
Table 1 also lists the Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) relating to Britain’s main trading partners. 3,4 They are
listed for both the EU and EFTA.5 Concerning the EU’s RTAs, it is apparent that most of them do not matter very
much to the UK. The RTAs relating to Switzerland, South Korea and Norway are the only ones relating to the UK’s
“top 15” of trading partners already in force, though negotiations have been completed for Canada and Singapore
(but both agreements have yet to be ratified). Negotiations have been launched with the US, China, India and Japan
but if/when they will be concluded is uncertain. Most worryingly, the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) is making disappointingly slow progress.6 Meanwhile, negotiations have been suspended with
the GCC and Russia and there are no RTA negotiations with Hong Kong and Australia (all in the UK’s “top 15”). But
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the EU’s deals are not without merit and, as already indicated, would probably continue on Brexit.
Turning to EFTA’s RTAs, there are agreements with Hong Kong, South Korea, Canada and Singapore in the UK’s
“top 15” and, of course, if the UK re-joined EFTA there would be free trade with Switzerland and Norway. EFTA also
has an RTA with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which entered into force in 2014, though there have been some
difficulties with implementation.7 EFTA has ongoing negotiations with India whilst Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan is “on
hold” and there are no RTA negotiations with Australia. But, all in all, EFTA’s trade agreements are an encouragingly
close “fit” vis-à-vis the UK’s current trading patterns and, therefore, of significant potential economic benefit.
EU and EFTA trade agreements: final remarks
Not merely do the EFTA trade agreements appear to be more comprehensive and a “better fit” for the UK’s trading
patterns than EU ones, but there are also arguments that favour EFTA’s approach to the EU’s.
EFTA states are much less likely to be constrained by diverging interests than the EU so they can reach agreement
between themselves quickly in negotiations, whereas diverging interests in the EU can lead to both delay and
dilution. The Economist, for example, has commented that “…trying to satisfy all 28 of its Members means that the
EU often takes years to negotiate free-trade agreements”. Unsurprisingly, EFTA has concluded trade deals relatively
quickly compared with the EU in several cases.8 And on dilution, France, for example, insisted on the exclusion of
the audio-visual sector, as a “cultural exception”, from TTIP.
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